The development of strategies for the conservation and wise use of wetlands in Uganda is significant for what it reveals about how law contributes to the sustainable management of natural resources in poor countries in general. The highly inter-disciplinary and cross-sectoral management requirements of wetlands make this issue one of the most challenging, and wetlands constitute today the single most important environmental issue being addressed by the Ugandan government. As part of this effort, the legal frameworks for property rights and local government are being overhauled so as to provide a sounder basis for environmental management in this field. This article analyses the Ugandan approach to wetlands management and the role of property rights and local government in the environmental policy-making process.
The return to stable government under President Yoweri Museveni has provided Uganda with a new opportunity to establish legal and institutional frameworks for better environmental management. Since political independence in 1962, environmental conditions in Uganda have deteriorated greatly, particularly under the mismanagement and corruption of Presidents Milton Obote and Idi Amin who governed intermittently from 1963 to 1985.' Since 1986, Uganda has been ruled by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, headed by President Museveni. The NRM government came to power through a protracted civil war with the second Milton Obote regime. The civil war brought considerable suffering to much of the population, particularly to those communities whose lands were damaged during the fighting. During this time, Uganda's extensive wetlands played a key role in providing refuge for the NRM forces between combat. Through this experience, the NRM leadership came to appreciate personally the importance of wetlands and other environmental resources in the life of rural communities.
Wetlands are a particular group of ecosystems sharing common management needs. 2 All wetlands have some association with water, from permanently water-logged swamps to ephemeral river floodplains. They are also distinguished by the fact that they contain aquatic vegetation influenced by light. Thus the edges of lakes and rivers can be considered 110
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wetlands where they contain vegetation and are not deeper than six metres. The ecological parameters of wetlands extend well beyond the physical site, as some of the most significant influences on them originate from the upper gradients of the water catchment area. It is estimated that about 29,500 km 2 or 13 per cent of Uganda is wetland, although wetlands are unevenly distributed and occur mostly around the well-watered Lake Victoria. The main wetland types found in Uganda are valley bottom swamps, swamp forest and deltaic wetlands. 3 Wetlands pose special management problems because of the plethora of uses which they provide, and the fact that these uses can conflict with each other. The main economic uses of wetlands in Uganda are water supply and transport, hydropower generation, pollution purification through retention of sediment and toxins, irrigated agriculture, livestock, fisheries and tourist recreation activities. 4 Wetlands contribute to the moderation of local and regional climate and to the regulation of mineral cycles and the water regime, and are important for the conservation of biological diversity. In addition, they have a number of traditional cultural uses for rural communities, such as the collection of plants for food and making medicines, as well as plants for building and craft activities, subsistence fisheries, hunting game and special ceremonial activities. The problem is that the planning and management of wetlands utilization has been unsystematic and haphazard, sometimes favouring one or two particular users. The loss and degradation of wetlands is of serious concern because it leads to a general deterioration of the quality of life and reduction in the options for rural development.
Wetlands in Uganda are threatened by uncontrolled conversion to other types of land uses. The most significant threat has come from expanding agricultural production, which has led to the drainage of wetlands and their conversion to cultivation or pastoralism, the diversion of wetland waters for irrigated cultivation, and pollution from pesticides and other chemicals used in farming. The production benefits of agricultural drainage operations are only short-term and are frequently monopolized by a few wealthy farmers, while denying the multiple benefits which the wetlands formerly supplied to local communities. Major drainage schemes in Uganda took place in Kibale and Kigezi districts during the 1970s to allow for dairy farming and intensive crop cultivation. 5 Farmers from these areas are now complaining about the loss of wetlands because of changes in microclimate, reduction in soil fertility and the lowering of the water table which has caused wells to dry up.
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In the wake of global environmental decline, the international community has increasingly endorsed the use of law and administration as necessary tools for achieving sustainable development in all countries.
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In Uganda, law has so far played a generally peripheral, if not dysfunctional, role in environmental management. Uganda is burdened by an eclectic and fragmented legal system, composed of remnant indigenous customary practices, various ordinances and institutions inherited from the British colonial administration, and more recent legislation based sometimes on Western models insufficiently tailored to local economic and social circumstances. Before colonial intervention, rural communities had evolved various customary rules which governed use of natural resources, such as forests and wetlands. These indigenous management systems arose in a milieu of low population and simple, low energy-demanding technology. The authority of customary environmental norms has since weakened with the infusion of new technology and the commercialization of agricultural production, coupled with demographic pressures which have intensified exploitation of resources. Where traditional management systems survive, customary rules remain inadequately recognized in a national legal system rooted in a skewed preservationist philosophy of the environment which has led authorities largely to ignore wise management of natural resources outside formally gazetted protected areas.
The structures and institutions set up by the colonial rulers continue to exert a profound influence on contemporary environmental decisionmaking, despite 30 years of independence in Uganda. 13 A major legacy has been the growth of a swollen, complex and overly-centralized system of administration. The national bureaucracies are ill-adapted to natural resources management, often over-politicized, sanctions-oriented and without public participation in their functions. Uganda has about 70 statutes dealing with aspects of the environment, but they are essentially resource management laws, concerned primarily with the allocation and distribution of rights to exploit resources among the various bureaucratic agencies. The environment is parcelled out into separate laws governing exploitation of water, forests, minerals, fisheries, wildlife and so on. The legislation has a negative orientation, stressing what should not be done. As awareness has arisen of the ecological consequences of resource management practices, environmental provisions have simply been grafted onto the existing legal structure without any attempt to reorientate the underlying developmental philosophy of the law. The result is that the law is being stretched to implement policies that it was never originally intended to address.
Another legacy of colonialism was the establishment of a constitutional framework for democratic government when Uganda assumed political independence. Although there is a modicum of separation of powers among the legislature, executive and judicial arms of government, in practice the executive has played a pre-eminent role in the policy process and this has undermined the rule of law. The growth in executive power has coincided with the increasing centralization of power and the suppression of indigenous "self-organization", a phenomenon common throughout Africa in the post-independence era.
14 The legislature has played a subservient role in government, having been suspended altogether during the military dictatorship of Idi Amin. A strong executive may be able to push through specific policy changes, as its decisions are subject to minimal accountability. But where sweeping reforms of the law have been attempted, such as Amin's Land Reform Decree, the necessary political climate to implement the reforms has been missing. The state has a limited institutional capacity to intervene and regulate the environmental activities of rural communities, particularly with regard to diffuse occupations like hunting wildlife or removing vegetation.
Although existing legislation in Uganda theoretically provides a sufficient power with which to regulate the various uses of wetlands, there is an administrative culture and political-economic milieu which does not easily lend itself to an environmentally enlightened application of the law. The vast array of statutory powers at the disposal of the government has traditionally been harnessed to facilitate the drainage and reclamation of swamps and the extraction of water. The predominant considerations are nearly always increasing agricultural production and land acreage. Wetlands have never been accorded a legal framework in their own right, but rather have come under the administration of an array of ministries. Thus, use of wetlands is influenced by water resources legislation (Waterworks Act, 1928 which has rules governing water extraction and pollution discharge), forestry laws (Forest Act, 1947 for swamp forests and protection of forests in watershed areas), protected areas legislation (National Parks Act, 1952 for wetlands which fall within national parks) and financial/commerce laws which can influence decisions taken on the investment in and development of wetlands. The result is that they have been managed in a disjointed and frequently narrow, sectoral manner, being exploited for a single purpose, depending on the priorities of the controlling ministry: for example, for irrigated agriculture, domestic water supply or flood control. Wetlands traditionally have not been perceived by government authorities as having a variety of functions and values which could be managed on a multiple use basis. Local people tend to feel that wealthy outsiders have been given preferential access to this resource with little or no return to the people.
Under President Museveni, Uganda has been exposed to a new paradigm of environmental law derived from international sources. 15 Through the development of international environmental conventions and associated instruments, the emphasis in legal theory has shifted from reactive "command and control" processes to a proactive role embodied in procedures for integrated environmental planning and environmental impact assessment. Since March 1988, Uganda has been a party to the
Ramsar Convention. This obliges state parties to, inter alia, designate wetlands for inclusion in a "List of Wetlands of International Importance" (art. 2(1)); ensure that land use planning promotes "as far as possible the wise use of wetlands" (art. 3(1)); and establish wetland nature reserves or parks (art. 4(1)). 16 Although Uganda began addressing aspects of wetlands management before it acceded to the Ramsar Convention, participation in the Convention has not greatly facilitated management efforts because its provisions are not easily translated into action on the ground. Implementation has been made the responsibility of the Department of Environment Protection (DEP) within the Ministry of Water, Energy, Minerals and Environment Protection (MWEMEP). Uganda has not yet enacted legislation which specifically implements the Ramsar Convention, and at this stage it is implementing its international obligations through policy development and administration action. It has so far nominated one site (Lake George) for placement on the Wetlands List. Further initiatives are detailed later in this article. But translating management objectives into legal and institutional structures is hampered by the generality of the Convention, particularly its lack of definition of how to achieve "wise use" of wetlands, and its implicit reliance on concepts of Western environmental law, such as establishment of national parks, environmental impact assessment and other technical approaches. This approach ignores the social and economic constraints facing lower income countries in environmental management. The types of environmental laws being promoted often assume the existence of a certain institutional capacity in terms of available financial resources, technical expertise and bureaucratic competence.
Two of the most important, but neglected, factors which shape the management of natural resources in Uganda are property law and local government. To appreciate the role of property rights and local government in this respect, it is necessary to understand the changes that have occurred in environmental management since pre-colonial times. Traditional indigenous management systems, although quite diverse, tended to have two common elements. 18 First, there were rules and rights concerning access to resources, which determined who could enter and use land for certain purposes. Kinship ties were important in determining access rights. Secondly, there were rules and rights concerned with control of the way land was used. The control tier of the management regime was often vested in a clan chief or a council of tribal elders, who would determine how the land could be used and the level of resource use. The continuing role of "See generally S. L. T. Golding, "Beyond the Ramsar Convention: A proposal for the international protection of wetlands through binding regional agreements", (1992) Nor have non-government or self-help groups been able to fill this vacuum because of occasional hostility from the state and lack of opportunities for participation in the policy process. The NRM government under President Museveni has made a concerted effort to update environmental legislation in Uganda, ensuring that more realistic rules are adopted that accord with the country's social and economic situation. New laws are being drafted for the management of water resources and national parks, as well as an umbrella national environment Act. But the NRM government has given greatest attention to the development of wetlands policy and legislation.
The National Wetlands Conservation and Management Programme (NWCMP) was launched in 1989 by the then Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) in collaboration with the World Conservation Union (IUCN). Based now in the Department of Environment Protection (DEP), a prime objective of the NWCMP has been to formulate a national policy "for wetlands protection and utilization, which would lay the basis for environmentally sound management and maximum sustainable productive use of the wetland systems". As an interim measure, the Ministry issued a directive to all district administrators suspending further large-scale drainage of wetlands pending formulation of the national policy and the development of guidelines for assessing drainage proposals. The directive exempted subsistence-level drainage and some ongoing agricultural projects. The wetlands policy is being co-ordinated with the assistance of an InterMinisterial Committee on Wetlands (IMCW) which ensures inputs from the various government sectors.
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"NWCMP, op. cit., 4. 20 The existence of a national ban on wetlands drainage has not precluded some specific small scale agricultural developments of wetlands taking place. One of the current schemes is the "Development of Small Scale Irrigation and Swamp Reclamation" project, sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture for the Lake Victoria Crescent: The objectives of the first phase of the NWCMP, which ended in February 1992, were to make an inventory of wetland resources; identify and assess current and potential threats to these wetlands; provide the Ministry with the technical capacity to perform environmental impact assessments of proposed wetland development activities; educate government and communities about the economic and social benefits of environmentally sound management of wetlands; and develop a draft wetlands policy and management guidelines. 22 The second phase of the NWCMP, which will end in June 1995, is to focus on developing specific activities that demonstrate the sustainable utilization of wetlands for local communities (such as papyrus harvesting and waste treatment capacity of swamps), as well as to establish an effective wetland management structure at the district level which will allow integration of line ministry inputs and the development of local wetland knowledge and expertise. 23 The wetlands policy and management guidelines will be finalized, and the Ministry of Justice has been requested to draft legislation to implement the policy.
Parellel to this initiative is the development of Uganda's National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) which gives attention to wetlands issues. The NEAP was launched in August 1991 and is expected to be completed by December 1993. 25 As a pre-condition to further World Bank development aid, the NEAP process aims to provide a framework for integrating environmental concerns into the nation's overall economic and social development. The preparation of the NEAP is co-ordinated by a Secretariat and nine task forces charged to review specific environmental issues, including wetlands and water resources. The NEAP Task Force on Wetlands, Water Resources, Fisheries and Aquatic Biodiversity surveyed the existing institutional framework for water and wetlands management and offered suggestions to strengthen it. 26 The wetlands task force is working in conjunction with the NWCMP and there is a sharing of personnel and experience.
Despite the clear political will to reform environmental policy in Uganda, there is a danger that the well-intentioned policies will flounder because of a failure to ensure that new natural resources management exercises accord with local government and land tenure regimes. Although detailed legislation has recently been drafted to restructure property law and local administration, the proposed amendments do not explicitly or adequately consider their environmental ramifications.
PROPERTY LAW
Property law involves defining and regulating the manner in which land and other valuable items are owned, occupied and used. This article is concerned with the role of land tenure in property law. Land tenure is a fundamental issue in Uganda, because land remains the major means of production and agriculture the main economic activity. The rules of 22 NWCMP, op. cit., 6-7. 23 Ibid., 37. 24 A study was commissioned to identify the major existing laws which have a bearing on wetlands: see M. Ssekagya, Review of Existing Legislation with Relevance to Wetlands, Law Development Centre, Kampala, 1991 Today, property law has become disjointed and overly complex for directing rational land management. Although Uganda has detailed legislation governing land tenure, uncertainty exists as to which form of tenure "wetlands" fall into. They can occur on public land, freehold, leasehold and under customary tenure. Although swamps and marshes are generally treated as public land, it is unclear whether this encompasses all types of wetlands such as seasonal floodplains. A further complication is that public land may be subject to variable customary rights of resource use. By custom, wetlands have generally been treated as common property, but even here the situation can be complicated in the case of seasonal floodplains and pools which, when the water recedes, are divided into individual plots for crop cultivation. Even where it is clear that wetlands fall under unencumbered government title, there may still be confusion as to which arm of government has the relevant managerial responsibilities. The streamlining of property law has been identified as a vital precursor to the implementation of a national wetlands policy.
The major tension in property law has been between the statutory freehold and other colonial-derived legal categories, and the persistence of indigenous customary tenure regimes. The Torrens-title system, which has been introducted into Uganda, is based on the statutory registration and ownership of individually demarcated plots, in contrast to a system of customary law concerned with defining the quantum of rights and interests, in terms of space and time, over the particular productive and cultural functions of land among members of a community. 28 The totality of ownership of land under British property law is signified in the rule: whose is the soil, his is also that which is up to the sky and down to the depths of the earth. 29 But in indigenous systems, the rules governing access to and control of land vary according to how the land is used. Thus, in any given area of land a number of persons can each hold rights to a. specific range of functions, such as cultivation of crops, grazing of livestock, and the drawing of water. Each activity attracts varying degrees of control exercised at different levels in the community. Whilst cultivation practices might be regulated by the family unit, the use of wetland resources could be a matter of concern for a wider number of people. The primary obligation of those with custody of the land is to ensure equal access to members of their community and to preserve the land's resources for posterity. In all cases,
however, individual autonomy in land matters is limited, as land cannot be transferred or put to different uses without the consent of the family or clan.
The pressures brought to bear on customary tenure regimes through changing technological practices and cultural beliefs, coupled with the imposition of exogenous tenure categories, has tended to create uncertainty in society over rights of access and control to resources such as wetlands. The mosaic of tenure rights and the lack of definition of land management responsibilities has fostered a situation where local communities have tended to lose control over determining use of wetlands. The uncertainty of tenure encourages people to claim undisturbed areas and start hurried, and often inappropriate, development. Traditional indigenous authority structures, which were the basis of common property regimes, have been eroded under the authority of the state as it seeks to centralize administration. 30 Yet the state generally lacks the institutional capacity to take over and regulate all these common properties effectively. The result, according to one recent report, is that "varied land tenure systems in the country make the administration of land costly and confused".
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The confused state of property law today can be traced back to the various land agreements made between the Protectorate government and the native kingdoms, and more recently to badly-conceived changes introduced by the Amin and Obote regimes. Following the proclamation of the Ugandan protectorate in 1894, the British government sought to acquire territory in the more settled parts of the country, through the signing of formal agreements with the local rulers: Buganda (1900), Toro (1900), Ankole (1901) and Bunyoro (1933) . The main features of these agreements were: (i) land described as "waste and uncultivated", such as swamps, was designated as Crown land; (ii) rights over certain valuable resources, such as forests and wildlife, were reserved to the Crown; (iii) Crown land could be occupied and used under license; (iv) with the exception of the Bunyoro Agreement, local rulers were granted personal estates equivalent to freehold. In Buganda, these estates were termed "mailo" 32 ; (v) customary rights on Crown land were not abolished but allowed to continue at the discretion of the government. On mailo and freehold land, customary users became tenants of the new land holders.
After independence, the Milton Obote government moved to consolidate all Crown (public) land under the Ugandan Lands Commission and to clarify the incidence of this land through the Public Lands Act, 1969. Mailo land tenure was abolished by the 1967 Constitution, as part of a broader effort to scrap hereditary titles in Uganda. The push to centralize administration of land continued under President Idi Amin who in 1975 promulgated the Land Reform Decree. This provided that all land belonged to the state, and individuals could lease it for approved purposes. It made land holders liable to eviction, and this sense of insecurity deterred farmers from investing in necessary agricultural improvements.
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Insufficient resources precluded implementation of the Decree, and few landowners were willing to co-operate with the authorities in converting to the new system. The Obote II government was also unable to streamline property law. In 1983, a working group within the Agricultural Policy Committee was convened by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development to study land tenure arrangements. The working group recommended that the Land Reform Decree be re-examined in order to formulate a new national land tenure policy. 34 Further studies sponsored by the Committee recommended repeal of the Decree and facilitation of a free land market where existing tenures would be converted to freehold.
Most recently, a review of the environmental implications of land tenure arrangements was undertaken in 1992 by one of the Task Forces established under the Ugandan NEAP. Through the NEAP process, the government has committed itself to adopting a "comprehensive land tenure system" incorporating conditions for environmental conservation. 35 A committee established under the Ministry of Lands has drafted a Tenure and Land Use Bill in 1993 to give effect to this objective.
PUBLIC LAND
Public land is defined by section 27(1) of the Public Lands Act to include all water resources such as swamps. These areas are vested in the Uganda Land Commission (ULC), subject to individual rights of reasonable use for domestic and agricultural purposes (s. 27(2)).
36 Swamps and other wetlands have never been technically defined and gazetted as public land. However, when public lands are leased to individuals, environmental protection conditions can be written into the conveyance agreements to account of the special environmental features. For example, the Public Lands (Settlement Areas) Rules provide that occupation licences may be issued subject to conditions for soil conservation, crop cultivation and grazing animals, and the planting of trees.
Whilst there is no statutory prohibition against leasing wetlands, from time to time there have been moves to limit access to these areas. The Protectorate government showed little interest in preserving wetlands which were viewed primarily as waste areas to be converted for agricultural production. This attitude was entrenched in the 1950s by a series of reports prepared by Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners which identified areas suitable for drainage and conversion to agricultural production. 37 An "informal administrative practice" against leasing the diminishing number of swamps and marshes began in the 1960s, but the practice generally broke down during the chaos of the Amin regime.
38 Some district 34 A g r i c u l t u r a l Policy C o m m i t t e e , administrations took matters into their own hands. In Bushenyi district, the District Commissioner distributed a circular to all county chiefs in 1982 instructing them that the drainage of swamps was illegal and should be prevented. 39 In part, this stance was taken in response to the trenchant opposition of small farmers to the appropriation of communal wetlands by wealthy entrepreneurs. 40 Yet even when, in September 1986, the Ministry of Environment Protection issued a decree banning further drainage of wetlands, powerful business interests continued to acquire development leases over wetlands from the then Ministry of Lands and Surveys, in complete disregard of local administrators. 41 Indeed, as recently as 1984 the World Bank advised the Ugandan government that drainage of wetlands was an acceptable strategy for increasing the country's arable land. The Bank noted that some districts:
"include large areas of swampland, and as population density increases there will be a growing justification for utilizing such swamps for intensive crop production, rather than applying labor to low potential upland soils. Swamp development at present is polarized between low cost single family plots on swamp margins and high cost, sophisticated intensive rice production schemes. The latter have high unit costs and the former only make use of a fraction of the available land. Technology is required which will initiate primary drainage by mechanical means, but leave individual plot development to farming families so that the overall cost is at a level which can be widely applied."
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Despite a national ban on leasing wetlands, the ULC has continued to do so, mainly because it does not have the expertise and resources to determine whether or not a piece of land proposed for lease contains any wetlands. 43 Most wetlands are too small to appear on maps prepared by the Department of Surveying and Mapping. The ULC is meant to carry out land inspections before granting a lease, but the district land committees that it relies upon are generally unable to perform this task. These committees fell into disuse during the 1980s because their members were not regularly remunerated and did not receive allowances to cover the costs of site inspections. Because of the resulting delays in processing a lease application, many applicants have simply occupied sought land.
The ULC is composed of lawyers and academics appointed by the President and does not have the in-house technical expertise to assess the environmental ramifications of lease applications. It has never approached the DEP for advice on a lease application, but individual district administrators have occasionally done so. On these occasions, the Department has sent technical officers to inspect the site proposed for lease. More usually, the ULC checks lease applications with the Department of Physical Planning, which is required to determine the "appropriateness" of the development proposed for the land in question. But this task is normally done for urban areas only. When the ULC meets monthly to consider a pile of lease applications, each application is affixed with any comments and recommendations from other interested government agencies who have examined it. Each is considered for a few minutes only, 39 Cited in ibid. 40 The NWCMP has recommended that wetlands remain public land, and that the ULC "should seek clearance from the MEP before allocating any further wetland areas, and previously leased wetlands should be examined with a view to returning them to the status of public land". 44 The NWCMP has released "Guidelines for Wetlands Developers" which stipulate that applications to develop wetlands larger than 0.25 hectares should be forwarded to the district administration, and copied to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for environmental matters, after approval by the Resistance Committees in the area concerned. However, the NWCMP recognizes that the Department does not currently have the resources to assess all leases, and that the institutional capacity to do so will need to be developed among local authorities. Further, as many of the leases run for 99-year terms, it could prove very costly to revoke leases over wetlands. Section 37 of the Public Lands Act provides that where public land is resumed, the occupier of the land (such as a customary user) is entitled to be paid compensation in accordance with the Public Lands (Compensation for Resumption) Act, 1965. 45 . According to lawyers in the Ministry of Justice, however, it is unclear whether the ULC has ever had the authority to convey rights over wetlands when there is a legal presumption that certain resources always remain vested in the state, such as minerals and water. 46 At issue is the relationship between the Public Lands Act, which expressly reserved all water resources to the state, and the Land Reform Decree which did not do so, but simply vested all land in the ULC as public land without distinguishing between dry and wet land. In theory, the Public Lands Act only applies today to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the more recent Land Reform Decree. But the Ministry of Justice believes the 1975 Decree implied a reservation of water resources to the state where land is leased.
Because of the central government's limited institutional capacity to regulate most land use, the consolidation of all land under state ownership is not likely to be beneficial for environmental management. Nationalization of land can encourage the attitude that these areas are open access resources for exploitation. One university study noted: "the unscrupulous exploitation of the wetlands which are largely found on public land is evident of this attitude". 47 The paucity of public resources in Uganda coupled with the historic instability of the central government, has meant that the ULC and its agents have been unable to assess applications to lease public land properly and hence ensure proper land use. 48 To do so effectively would require the necessary zoning, planning, classification and valuation of the land. 44 Through customary land tenure, many rural communities in Uganda evolved rules for the management of natural resources, including wetlands, which they have traditionally utilized for a variety of economic and cultural purposes. In pre-colonial Uganda, land tenure arrangements differed remarkably between tribes, with a hierarchical, quasi-feudal system of distributing land in the more developed western regions and Buganda, contrasting with a decentralized, clan-based tenure system in the less populated northern and eastern regions. Differences between these two broad approaches did not have a significant bearing on actual land use patterns, except that in the more fertile lands crop cultivation was generally preferred over pastoralism. In general, customary law gave families an absolute inheritable right to the use and possession of land under their effective occupation. This included ownership of the products of the land cultivated. In most cases, important resources areas such as forests and swamps were treated as common property which people had access to for subsistence purposes through customary rules. These environmental norms and usages generally carried the force of law, in the sense that they were regarded as obligatory, with contravention punished by formal mechanisms. Although aspects of these traditional management systems have been altered or obliterated with the intrusion of new technologies and development activities, some practices have persisted and continued to evolve as part of customary lore, as well as being articulated through newer community-based "self-help" groups and non-government organizations (NGOs) such as the Wildlife Clubs of Uganda. And despite government attempts to circumscribe it, customary tenure remains the most widespread form of property law in Uganda. 50 For those areas utilized on a communal basis, user rights developed through a process of popular consultation and discussion among family and wider clan units, with a council of male elders or chief usually exercising supreme authority. 51 Some of the management practices still applied to wetlands are as follows. First, there are access rules which define and limit access and use rights to the resource among community members. Rules can set closed seasons/days on which the resource is not to be exploited. Secondly, superstition, such as animal totems and taboo species, helps limit exploitation of particular animals and birds. Some wetlands are designated as sacred sites for the performance of certain cultural rites such as circumcision ceremonies. Thirdly, there are restrictions on equipment, such as nets, which can be used to harvest fish and other resources found in wetlands. These norms are usually based on peer-group pressure, social custom and tradition, but in some communities amount to binding law. Sometimes local management practices may oscillate from "hard" law to softer norms depending upon environmental conditions. During good times of resource abundance, management rules are less rigorously enforced. But when conditions deteriorate and there is scarcity, such as during a drought, 49 The Wildlife Clubs have been involved in some wetlands issues, such as a census of crowned cranes which are an important indicator species of the health of wetlands, see: P. G. Mafabi, "The role of public awareness in wetland management", in The People ' One of the most detailed empirical studies of swamp management was conducted by Margaret Lwanga. Researching in Masaka and North Kiruruma districts, Lwanga found that the wetlands were an integral part of the local agricultural economy and had been sustainably utilized through a variety of conservation practices. 53 The swamps were highly valued for their craft/construction materials, medicinal plants, cultivation and stock grazing space, as well as being reliable sources of water. 54 To maintain these benefits, farmers adopted specific conservation practices such as mixed cropping, use of composite manure (to renew fertility) and planting of certain vegetation (to main soil structure). 55 However, these customary practices did not have the force of law. In some areas, the subdivision of land and the concomitant growth of cash cropping has been accompanied by wealthy farmers appropriating swamps and carrying out drainage work.
56 Lwanga surmised that the new commercial-oriented farmers lacked sufficient empirical knowledge to utilize the swamps in a sustainable way. 57 Other studies have found that farmers sometimes lack knowledge about the properties of wetlands, having a false impression that these areas are highly fertile but remain "unused" and hence "wasted". 58 In some communities there is a strong incentive to maximize exploitation of a resource where land rights are claimed through clearance of vegetation and cultivation of crops. 59 Further, even where particular communities can rationally deal with environmental issues at the local level, they may have little control over externally generated problems, such as pollution of upstream waters, or contending with outside development interventions.
Another criticism of customary management regimes is that not all members of a community share equally in the distribution of rights and responsibilities in the use of natural resources. Men, elderly people and the economically well-off enjoy the most influence over environment and development decisions at the local level. Yet these groups do not necessarily have superior knowledge or experience in the management of land, nor are they always the most affected by decisions taken. Women make up the bulk of the agricultural workforce, but they generally do not enjoy the same degree of influence as men in decision-making. Women have less access and control over income, information and land. The inferior position of women is reinforced by customary law which denies them the same property rights as men. Women's disadvantaged role in natural resources 52 P. Nkwi and F. Toornstra, "Overview paper: 124
management is illustrated by Lwanga. In her study of wetlands utilization in Uganda, she found that women carried out most of the sustainable lowintensity uses of swamps, such as collecting materials for handicrafts, but because these activities were regarded by some men as of limited economic utility, they tended to be downgraded in the face of alternative and seemingly more profitable developments of wetlands.
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Equity considerations do matter in environmental management because decisions taken to benefit minority interests are unlikely to be socially sustainable and this in turn can feed back into inappropriate land use. Whilst there is insufficient participation from women in local government institutions and traditional village structures, women have managed to play a leading role in the NGO sector, particularly in organizing self-help groups and in tree planting initiatives. Where women exercise power, it is often in subtle and private ways as against the public power of men.
The multiple functions and values of wetlands can also lead to social conflict over the best mix of uses. This is particularly so where one party seeks to impose a single dominant use such as an irrigation development. Conflict over wetlands tends to be more pronounced in the case of smaller wetlands or in drier areas where wetlands are relatively scarce and able to meet only a few needs. Where wetlands resources are more abundant, there is usually space for most uses to be accommodated and less incentive to define use rights clearly. Conflicts over wetlands are rarely resolved through the courts unless they involve land tenure issues. Depending on the level at which a dispute occurs, differences are usually reconciled through community forums with some intermediation by local administrators. Although conflicts can be aggravated by the participants not having adequate information about the costs and benefits of alternative uses, in many situations it is simply a result of imbalances of power between the disputants. In Uganda, rich farmers have been able to acquire and develop wetland sites in opposition to the interests of local users and even government administrators. Conflict over environmental goals can be compounded by the cultural diversity among different communities. The mixing of ethnic groups through migration and resettlement has laid the basis for conflicts over different approaches to utilization of wetlands. The agriculturalists' view of them as fertile areas to expand crop cultivation can conflict with pastoralists who seek to retain swamps as dry season grazing areas or with communities who want to keep wetlands in an undisturbed state because of their value for fisheries production.
It is unclear what role traditional approaches to environmental management will continue to have as Uganda undergoes further social and economic modernization. As the agricultural economy becomes more commercialized and integrated into international markets, customary law will probably continue to be replaced by government administration which tends to reflect exogenous values. Part of the explanation for the decline in customary land practices is the perception amongst policy-makers and some scientists that rural communities are myopic and rapacious in their utilization of the environment. For example, a United Nations Environment programme (UNEP) study on land tenure in Uganda remarked:
"Customary tenure throughout Uganda is characterized by natural resources misuse. Shifting cultivation has given way to ill-managed permanent cultivation and overgrazing. This is compounded by other practices such as Colonial and post-independence governments have tended to treat customary tenure as backward and as an obstacle to modern agricultural development. 63 In 1955, the East African Royal Commission reported that "customary tenure cannot satisfactorily meet the circumstance of land shortage and the demands on land for certain forms of economic use".
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The Protectorate government reacted with a set of Land Tenure Proposals which sought to encourage customary tenants to "graduate" to individual freehold tenure. 65 On unalienated government land, the Public Lands Act gives some recognition to customary occupants. Section 24(1) provides:
"Subject to the provisions of subsection (5) of this section it shall be lawful for persons holding by customary tenure to occupy without grant, lease or licence from the controlling authority any unalienated public land vested in the Commission if, (a) the land is not in an urban area; and (b) no tenancy or other right of occupancy has been created in respect of it."
The ULC is forbidden to alienate public land occupied by customary tenants without the consent of such persons (s. 20(2)). However, the Public Lands Act also provides that any public lands may be specially declared to be free of customary rights (s. 24(5)). For example, in 1969 the then Minister of Mineral and Water Resources declared large areas of swamp in Kigezi district free of customary users. 66 The status of customary tenure was further undermined in 1975 by the Land Decree which made customary land holders (along with mailo/freehold owners) mere tenants at the sufferance of the government (s. 3(2)). In the annotated commentary to the Decree, it is said: "if, therefore, the development requirements of the area where a customary tenant is holding land, require that his tenancy be terminated, it would be terminated . . . [and] he would be holding the land at the tolerance of the Commission".
In legal proceedings, the courts may enforce custom "which is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience and not incompatible either directly or by necessary implication with any written 126 
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law". 68 The civil jurisdiction of courts is confined mainly to matrimonial, succession and land tenure cases. Although customary law can be set aside by statute law, it will generally prevail over inconsistent rules of common law. In the case of The Kabaka's Government v. Musa N.S.W. Kitonto, LAW, J.A., reasoned that the fact the common law applies to Uganda only in so far as the circumstances of Uganda and its people permit (s. 3(3), Judicature Act) supported the conclusion that where common law and customary law conflict, the customary law prevails. 69 Nevertheless, the primacy of the courts in interpreting customary law invariably reduces the community's control over its development. Litigation in the Ugandan courts is based on the British adversarial system, a departure from traditional processes of community dialogue and mediation. Under this adversarial system of litigation, the admission of evidence is strictly controlled, and this tends to give recognition to only those interests or values that are capable of expression as legal rights. Thus, "soft" cultural values may be squeezed out of legal discourse in favour of more tangible economic and pecuniary interests. Court proceedings are also generally in English, although where an interpreter is available, evidence may be given in a tribal language.
Civil servants share this lack of familiarity with customary law. In order to forestall nepotism and other forms of corruption, an administrative convention has developed that encourages civil servants to be placed in localities other than where they originated. But this rule has contributed to a high turnover and transfer of staff" between districts, with the result that district officials frequently lack an intimate understanding of local lore. The most influential civil servants at the village level are the chiefs, who are not local representatives but agents of the Ministry of Local Government. The bureaucratic penchant for uniform and consistent administration is the antinomy to the diversity and social complexity of customary management systems.
Yet despite efforts to suppress it, customary tenure continues to evolve and play an integral role in shaping land use in Uganda. There is a long line of judicial authority that holds that customary law can change and adapt to new social and economic exigencies. In the case of Marko Kajubi v. Kulanima S. Kabali, SHERIDAN, C.J., asserted that "custom is not necessarily immutable. . . . The native community may assent to some modification of an original custom, but the modification must be made with assent of the native community. The Museveni government is now pushing to make private property the predominant form of land tenure in the country. Native freehold estates were first granted to tribal chiefs under the colonial land agreements. Mailo title, similar to freehold, was granted to chiefs in Buganda and was defined by the Buganda Land Law, 1908. It is likely that the colonial land agreements intended that any wetlands enclosed within mailo or freehold estates would be retained as public land and would remain open to the general public for domestic and agricultural purposes. For example, the Buganda Land Law expressly preserved a general easement over mailo land to watercourses. Rule 2(h) stated:
"Any person who becomes the owner of mailo, let him not think that he alone is the owner of the old roads on it which people have used of old, and let him not think that he has become the owner of running waters which were drawn by people long ago, and of the springs and ponds which people have drawn of old. And if running water should arrive upon his mailo, and if springs and ponds should come upon it, let him not think that he has become the exclusive owner of these waters, unless they shall dry up before they have reached his neighbour's land.
Thus a man who becomes the owner of mailo where there are roads which have been used by all the people long ago, or there are waters which have been taken by all the people long ago, he will not be allowed to close those roads or to prevent people from drawing from the water." 74 Many wetland patches were nevertheless subsumed within the freehold and mailo estates. This occurred because of the lack of precise surveying 71 in the land grants. 75 The facilities for detailed surveying and registration of plots did not exist at the time. 76 During the settlement survey to demarcate the lands under the Buganda Agreement, it was not the policy to excise the many small patches of swamp from the areas allotted to individual farmers. As the first freehold owners did not perceive proprietary rights over wetlands to be economically important, in many instances the boundary between land plots was traced along the centre-line of waterlogged land.
The impact of mailo and freehold land tenure on wetlands has not been limited to the subtraction of wetlands from communal use, but more generally has been associated with the increasing transformation of land into a tradeable commodity. 77 In reviewing the changes engendered by the introduction of the mailo system, the Protectorate government acclaimed that it "accelerated the abandonment of the old precarious subsistence economy and facilitated the introduction of the cash economy and agricultural development of Buganda". 78 Land would now be valued not by environmental or cultural considerations but largely according to commercial criteria related to its developmental potential.
Mailo and freehold tenure survived despite various attempts to expand the area of public land during the Amin and Obote governments. The Public Lands Act did not recognize mailo lands, but provided for the granting of freehold property to individuals by sale of public land for development purposes (s. 36 (1)). Title could be forfeited if the development conditions were not fulfilled. The Land Reform Decree went a step further, reducing all individual freehold tenure into 99-year leases, and converting freehold held by public organizations to 199-year leases. But the provisions of the Decree have never been implemented and in practice freehold tenure continues to exist in many areas.
The importance of private property in Uganda is set to change with the release in April 1993 of a Tenure and Land Use Bill. The Bill does not deal with land use arrangements per se, but is concerned with adjudication and issuance of land titles. It provides for the repeal of the Public Lands Act and the Land Reform Decree, and establishes a process whereby existing leases over public land can be converted to freehold title. No definition is given of "freehold". The government's long-term goal is to make all land private property, except for areas of national importance which would remain public land. 79 The Bill provides for the continuation of the ULC, but with the decentralization of some of its functions through the establishment of land adjudicatory committees (LACs) in local government units to oversee the conversion process and advise on land tenure disputes. All leases are to be converted to freehold once the LAC is satisfied on their validity (cl. 15(3)). Customary land users could also apply to convert their interest to freehold, albeit subject to a charge for surveying and administrative costs (cl. 15 (6) It restores a number of the protections which the Public Lands Act gave to customary landholders, but which the Land Reform Decree sought to abolish. Clause 15(2) gives protection to recognized customary tenants on public land by stipulating that applicants for freehold or a lease must satisfy the designated authority that any customary tenants using the land are agreeable to the proposed allocation (if they are not, the allocation cannot occur). On the other hand, the Bill has been criticized for its failure to recognize the legal interests of the many sub-tenants occupying and cultivating land without written agreements from leaseholders. 81 Under the revised tenure system, the Ministry of Lands intends to cancel all leases over wetlands and, subject to compensation payments, retain these sites as inalienable public land. 82 However, there is a danger that some wetlands now under leasehold could be inadvertently placed under private tenure, because the Ministry does not have the capacity to ensure that all leases are inspected before a decision is made on tenure conversion. In any event, the Ministry acknowledges that because of the potentially large compensation pay-outs that will have to be made, the resumption of wetlands will be a long-term process, perhaps over several decades.
A further imbroglio is that the Tenure and Land Use Bill provides for different tiers of government to manage wetlands. On the one hand, clause 37 provides for the continued vesting of all water resources (including wetlands) in the Uganda Land Commission (cl. 37), but clause 22 stipulates that communally managed property (which presumably includes water resources and wetlands) are to be vested in the district administration. Clause 22 reads: "(1) All interest in properties which are communally enjoyed by the community concerned and herein after referred to as common property resources is hereby vested in a local authority. (2) The local authority shall appoint a committee from the affected community for the purposes of managing the common property resource of that community. (3) [the local authority] shall take into account the size of the resource and the community which enjoys access to that resource. (4) [local authority means district administration]." As virtually all water resources and wetlands outside national parks are used by communities for subsistence purposes, clause 22 has the potential to vest virtually all water bodies in the district administrations rather than the ULC. Yet the Ministry of Lands intends that wetlands of "national importance" would remain under central government control vested in the ULC. 83 In any event, the district administrations, like the ULC, are institutionally situated too far from the resource and its users 80 to function as effective environmental managers. Clause 22 may also be in conflict with the protections given to the continuation of individual customary rights, which could be curtailed depending on the priorities of the controlling district administration. The next section of this article will examine ways in which environmental management functions have been built into local government structures such as the district administrations.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
As indigenous mechanisms for controlling land use have waned with the decline of customary law and break-up of traditional village organization, the role of local government has assumed a new importance in shaping rural development. Being closest to farming communities, local government is best placed to take over the control tier of customary land management. Effective management of wetlands is more likely to occur within the context of a strong and democratic system of local administration which can facilitate sustainable rural development and control inappropriate land use activities on the ground. Without a vibrant and productive agrarian economy, there is little chance that individual wetland resources can be protected or wisely used. Wetland degradation can occur where rural communities are acutely aware of the consequences of their actions, but through poverty and deprivation are compelled to pursue practices which are not sustainable. 84 Thus wetlands conservation needs to be integrated with local government processes which have the capacity to steer rural development programmes.
Although the legislative framework for local government in Uganda was enacted comparatively recently, it tends to draw on a strong tradition of indigenous local organization that was respected by the earlier British administration. Despite the significant powers of the provincial commissioners, the Protectorate government recognized the need to maintain an effective system of local government if administrative and developmental goals were to be attained. 85 The British colonialists found that it did not work to impose their own administrative structures, because if they tried to displace local authority figures, the result would be civil strife. In Buganda, the British administration was built on respect for traditional structures for local governance, particularly the hierarchy of chiefs which served under the Kabaka. The modern administrative categories of county (saza), sub-county (gombolola), parish (miruka), and sub-parish (batongole), corresponded to the traditional hierarchy of chieftain rule in Buganda. In the northern and eastern regions, where the nomadic Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic peoples were less rigidly organized, the protectorate government attempted to impose the Buganda model of local administra-84 P. J . D u g a n , (ed), Wetland Conservation: A Review of Current Issues and Required Action, I U C N , Gland, Switzerland, 1990, 83 . 85 The importance which the protectorate government attached to local government is reflected in the comprehensive inquiry into local government it commissioned: see C. A. G. tion. 87 Although this aroused some hostility from the indigenous people, an attempt was made to ensure that the boundaries of local administrative units corresponded to natural ethnic configurations as far as possible. 88 Where it was practised, the British system of "indirect rule" involved a respect for continuance of customary law on civil matters, subject to a paternalistic supervision by colonial authorities. 89 Today, Uganda has a two-tiered system of local government: a hierarchy of elected Resistance Councils which function mainly as local legislatures, and a parallel system of appointed district administrators and chiefs, as well as several types of urban authorities, that together are responsible for the implementation of policy. A government presence in the field is also maintained by the various ministries which post extension staff down to subcounty level, often working under the auspices of the district administration. The main features of local government are outlined in Table 1 . 89 See His Excellency the Governor of Uganda, "Indirect rule in Africa", The Uganda Herald, 1 July, 1936, 10-11. The Governor stated: "The native administration of each area is responsible, to the extent of the devolution to it in each case, for law and order, the collection of revenue, the construction and maintenance of roads, hospitals and dispensaries, schools, farms and so on; the natives enforce the law-the customary law of the people as modified from time to time, and such legislation as they may be empowered to enforce, as well as rules and orders made under statutory powers by the native authority. The native treasuries receive revenue from various sources and make all necessary payments. . . . These activities are all under the general supervision of the British administrative officers, whose ultimate relation to the native authorities may be compared to that of the Ministry of Health to local government bodies in England. . . . The supervision given may amount to no more than advice from time to time, the functions of an appellate and revisionary court, and audit: or it may have to go much further and be a close and real control. . ." [depending on the perceived degree of administrative competence of the community in question].
Wallis, Report of an Inquiry into African Local Government in the
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Institutional arrangements for environmental management at the local level are being restructured as part of the Ugandan government's push to decentralize the formulation and delivery of public services. 90 The NRM government has placed heavy emphasis on statutory mechanisms to restructure the framework of rural administration. Decentralized government is seen as facilitating rural development and increasing public revenue through improved local tax collection. Being closer to the people, local authorities are perceived as better placed to provide and account for government services. Decentralization can also help reduce the financial cost and long delays in decision-making caused by the constant reference of all issues of significance to Kampala.
Ironically, communication, logistics and administrative supervision were so poor under the authoritarian Amin and Obote regimes, that there was in effect a de facto decentralization of government. But it was a system of administration not conducive to sustainable rural development. As President Museveni noted: "[its] net effect [was] disastrous because district staff could neither be disciplined nor adequately supervised by parent ministries or local councils. This system allowed the district officers undue freedom to do what they pleased at the expense of local development while the local councils and their chief executives looked on helplessly." 92 The NRM government's decentralization programme began with the 1987 Commission of Inquiry into Local Government which recommended the enactment of legislation to establish a system of elected Resistance Councils to make government more accountable and responsive to local people's needs and priorities. 93 The second phase, which officially commenced on 1 July, 1993, is expected to result in a major overhaul of the local government legislation, which currently comprises the Urban Authorities Act, 1958 (Cap. 27), Local Administration Act, 1967 (No. 18), and the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute, 1987. A Bill entitled "The Local Government Statute" was prepared in early 1993, providing for the incorporation of aspects of the above legislation into a new streamlined and more decentralized system of local government, centred around the district administration and the hierarchy of Resistance Councils/Committees. 94 Local authorities are expected to have greater financial autonomy and control over the planning and implementation of most government programmes. 95 Only core policy advisors and managerial staff are to be retained at ministerial headquarters, which would continue to be responsible for the national policy framework within which local units
operate. Through its Decentralization Secretariat, the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) is to retain responsibility for co-ordinating the implementation of policy and monitoring of how local units perform. Initially, only 13 of the more economically advanced districts will decentralize in a trial period (the length of which has yet to be determined). Environmental planning and management functions are one of the major programme areas to be decentralized, although the final institutional arrangements have yet to be determined. A new district planning process is being launched, which will have a strong environmental component through the preparation of district environmental profile studies. Each district is also expected to have an advisory District Environment Committee (DEC) and a District Environment Officer (DEO) to coordinate environmental programmes, including wetlands. 96 The MWEMEP has stated that "in the long term, the conservation and management of wetlands will be effective only if rural communities have a stake in the utilization of their wetland resources".
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Of course, the changes proposed to the local government structure are meeting some resistance from central government ministries who fear losing resources to local authorities. These ministries prefer to strengthen their own system of vertical administration whereby policy is implemented by sector officers reporting directly to Kampala rather than district administrations.
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION AND CHIEFS
Uganda inherited from the British a system of government-appointed chiefs and district administrators to co-ordinate the delivery of central government services and functions at the local level. These local authorities are supervised by the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) which administers the Local Administrations Act (LAA). Some of the powers and responsibilities of the district administration are now defined by the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute (RCCS). Uganda is divided into about 40 districts (the number frequently changes), each administered by a District Administrator (DA), with further subdivisions headed by a chief.
A hierarchy of authorities exists for urban areas, of which the RCs form the elected council for each authority: city council (RC 5), municipal council (RC 4), town council (RC 3) and town board (RC 2). Some urban authorities ostensibly have control over wetlands in areas on the urban periphery. All urban authorities are required to prepare development plans for their jurisdiction, which should prescribe land use activities in such areas. But generally urban authorities do not have the "in-house" expertise to supervise developments affecting wetlands. 98 The functions of each district administration are "generally to assist in the maintenance of order and good government within the area of its authority" (s. 23, LAA), the meaning of which is determined largely by the MLG which appoints district officers and chiefs. The DAs, who are 96 Interview, Attorney-General Chambers, Ministry of Justice, Kampala, 18 March, 1993. 97 NWCMP, op. cit., 5. 98 For example, in February 1993 the Kampala City Council approached the DEP for advice about the environmental appropriateness of a proposed "allocation" of a wetland site to a private individual: interview, Department of Environment, Kampala, 18 March, 1993. In addition, the Local Administration Act provides for a hierarchy of chiefs (s. 39) who have miscellaneous responsibilities primarily related to keeping law and order (s. 40). Chiefs are posted at county, sub-county, parish and sub-parish level. A number of their functions have been superseded by the RCs, a matter which has caused conflict between these two arms of local government in some jurisdictions. 99 Chiefs now sit as exojjkio members of the RC Committees, but without the power to vote. The chiefs are the vehicle for implementation of government policy, collect taxes, organize communal labour for utilities work and arrest criminals. They have few responsibilities in land use matters, as their previous role in adjudicating land tenure disputes has been transferred to the RCs.
Although the proposed Local Government Statute will retain the basic components of the district administration (DA, DES and DDC), it provides for the abolition of the position of sub-parish chief and county chief, leaving only the sub-county and parish with a chief. In addition, it is proposed that each district administration will be able to hire and fire chiefs.
The decentralization programme is intended to enhance the environmental planning and management responsibilities of the district administrations through the definition of new roles for the DDC and the creation of a District Environment Committee (DEC). Although the DDCs have ostensibly had responsibility for district development planning, in practice they were often asked merely to rubber-stamp decisions already made at ministry headquarters. Although Uganda has had an ongoing five-year national development planning process, district planning stalled during the turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s, and is only now being revived as part of the NEAP process. District planning guidelines are being distributed by the Decentralization Secretariat of the MLG. Initially, the 13 districts chosen to decentralize first will each have an environmental technical officer posted from the DEP to assist in the development and implementation of the NEAP. District plans are expected to be updated biannually, and to be monitored by the National Environment Information Centre (NEIC). The NEIC is also to oversee preparation of an annual national state of the environment report.
Each district is eventually to have a DEC to give environmental input into the district planning process. Like the DDC, the DECs will be a committee of the district RC 5. The DDC is considered too large and 99 Y. R. Barongo, "The impact of NRM's programme of fundamental change at the local level: A study of the performance of the resistance councils system in Haima District," in E. G. Nabuguzi (ed. 100 The DEP intends to place environmental technical officers in each district to advise on a range of issues (including wetlands), but they could specialize in certain issues depending on each district's priorities. Because of limited resources, it is expected that it will take three to four years to have all districts staffed with environmental officers. 101 Like the DDC, the DEC would be an advisory body which would recommend courses of action to the RC 5 which makes final decisions on policy. Already, several districts have convened their own DECs, such as Mpigi and Kabale, with the blessing of the MLG. It will also be open to the RC 5 to establish other specialist committees (e.g. for water or wetlands management), depending on the requirements of each district. It is likely that the new environmental responsibilities to be devolved to the districts will be enshrined in the national environmental framework statute currently being drafted. This statute proposes to establish local environmental committees at RC 1-4 levels, which would be co-ordinated by the DEC of RC 5. 102 The lowertiered committees might be involved in community mobilization work, education campaigns, organizing environmental self-help groups, monitoring environmental activities and reporting to the District Environmental Officer.
In developing a national wetlands policy, the NWCMP has already been working with DDCs in raising awareness about wetlands and discussing strategies for wetlands protection. 103 As the decentralization process gets under way, it is expected that the DECs will take charge of co-ordinating wetlands management among local authorities and farmers. 104 According to the NWCMP, the main objective is "to establish an effective wetland conservation and management structure at the District level which will allow integration of line ministry inputs". 105 It has even been mooted by the MLC that a district wetlands sub-committee be set up within the DEC structure to allow a more focused management strategy, including education work, vetting applications to use wetlands and assisting in the prosecution of people who misuse wetlands.
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A major responsibility of the DECs will be to prepare district environmental profile studies, with the assistance of the NEIC, as a baseline for formulating comprehensive district development plans. 107 The ability of DECs to co-ordinate environmental management in their areas may be hampered by the fact that administrative boundaries sometimes rarely correspond to natural ecological criteria. The artificial and European
linear-based boundaries are a legacy of colonial government decisions. Administrative boundaries frequently follow river courses and other topographical features, thereby cutting across water catchment areas. But as planning has to be done within some administrative entity, the government views the districts as the most appropriate institutional vehicle for this. 108 A number of the 13 districts to undergo decentralization first will act as pilot districts (e.g. Rukai and Iganda) for environmental planning exercises. The pilot scheme will test different models for relationships between the RCs and the district administration in terms of environmental management.
RESISTANCE COUNCILS
The RC system was established to consolidate the NRM's support during the civil war with the government of Milton Obote, but today it is geared toward a range of developmental objectives, as well as fostering political and administrative accountability. 110 The Resistance Councils and Committees Statute provides for the establishment, composition and hierarchy of a system of committees and councils which embrace quasilegislative, judicial and administrative powers. All these bodies operate under the general supervision of the District Administration (s. 1(1)), and are divided into councils from the village, parish, sub-county, county and district levels, in a pyramid structure (s. 2(1)). These are designated RC I, RC II, RC III, RC IV and RC V respectively. Section 3(1) deals with the composition and hierarchy of the RCs. Direct elections occur only for RC I, thereafter elections are indirect, with elected representatives of one tier forming the electorate to choose membership at the higher tier, and so on up the RC ladder.
The RCs have specific legislative functions. Whilst they do not have any specific environmental management responsibilities, each council is designated "a policy-making organ" within its area of jurisdiction, with obligations to: "(a) identify local problems and find solutions thereto: (b) formulate and review development plans: (c) at the District level, pass annual estimates; (d) make bye-laws in accordance with section 25 of this Statute; and (e) perform such other functions as may be delegated to it by the Minister" (s. 6). This section is broad enough to encompass environmental policy functions. In making policy, the RCs are required to meet every two to three months, with meetings to be generally open to the public (s. 7(6)). Where a question cannot be determined by consensus, it is determined by a simple majority (s. 7(9)). Council minutes are to be open for inspection during normal office hours to members of the public (s. 8 (3-4) ). The Ministry of Justice ratifies all RC bye-laws, which are first channelled through the MLG.
Each RC comprises a nine-person executive Resistance Committee (RCom) that is responsible for the implementation of the policies and 108 Ibid. 109 Interview, NEAP Secretariat, Kampala, 18 March, 1993 . ""See J. Oloka-Onyango, "Law, 'grassroots democracy' and the national resistance movement in Uganda", (1989) Although the RCs have been generally slow to take up environmental issues, their environmental responsibilities will increase substantially under the decentralization programme. One of their important new responsibilities, particularly for RC 5, will be to contribute to the revived district planning process. Submissions for development plans are to be drawn up by the RC 3 for consideration by RC 5. The RCs are also to be more involved in land tenure issues, with applications for leases of public land initially channelled through the local RC which must determine whether there are any adverse claims to the title of the land in question. Already several RCs have started to address issues of wetlands conservation. In one instance, it is reported that an RC 1 in Rukungiri district successfully mobilized local people to prevent a foreign businessman from appropriating a communally-used wetland for a cattle ranching enterprise." 5 The businessman's claim to have a valid lease over the wetland site was challenged by the RC officials because no mandatory site inspection had been completed prior to granting the lease.
'""Customary law" is defined in s. 37 as "the rules of conduct established by custom and long usage having the force of law and not forming part of the common law nor formally enacted in any legislation". This requirement of "long usage" is not consistent with the idea of dynamic and quickly evolving customary law in response to new environmental problems. ' 6 Where RCs and local communities are aware of wetlands issues, they may not have adequate technical knowledge to translate mere awareness into precise management actions. Even where RCs in Bushenyi and Kabale districts have drawn up bye-laws providing for the protection of local wetlands from drainage and other threats, the MLG has failed to ensure their ratification after a three-year delay. 117 Lawyers within the Ministry of Justice have now drafted model bye-laws for wetlands management, following the principles enunciated in the national wetlands policy; but no RC has yet adopted them.
Despite central government intransigence, some RCs have shown themselves to be innovative organizers when it comes to addressing environmental problems in their region. For example, in the Apac district where massive illegal felling of forests has been taking place, the local RCs helped set up a local environmental committee to ensure that every household had access to sufficient woodfuel (through the creation of tree nurseries) so as to alleviate the pressure on the indigenous forest.
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Several issues remain to be resolved in ensuring that RCs fulfil their role as effective natural resources managers under the decentralization programme. By making them responsible for some taxation functions, there is a danger that myopic decisions could be taken to bolster revenue by maximizing the exploitation of natural resource products, such as from forests. Another problem is that many RC officials, especially at RC 1-2 levels, are believed to lack appropriate educational qualifications to undertake all their responsibilities. 119 The lack of participation of women in the RCs has also not been seriously addressed. Although each RC is to reserve one seat for a woman, women who participate in public affairs tend to be stigmatized as "neglecting" their familial responsibilities. 120 This is a particular problem with Moslem households. Often women simply do not have the time to participate because most of their day is taken up with household chores, and they may not perceive any hard economic returns to justify time spent participating in RC meetings. A fourth problem is the absence of a clear separation of powers and the lack of checks and balances within the RCs, with may hamper the taking of an impartial and objective approach to carrying out their functions. 121 For example, it is alleged that RC officials based near Lake Mburo National Park had attempted to sell portions of the park to friends and relatives who had been squatting there. 122 In other instances, it has even been reported that RC officials have been involved in the poaching of protected game.
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The RC system suggests that the decentralization effort is understood primarily in terms of technical administration, wherein sector ministry officers are to report to district officials and the RCs, rather than Kampala. The RCs remain under the ultimate control of the central government through the MLG. For example, the power to suspend a RCom vests in the Minister on the recommendation of the District Administrator (s. 9(2)). This power has been exercised, such as in Rukai district in 1991. 124 No legal provision is made for a RCom to appeal such a decision, final power in the matter resting with the National Resistance Council (s. 9(3)). Central government control is reinforced through the political indoctrination given to RC officials. 125 it is impossible to expect RC members as functionaries of the NRM political regime to be entirely objective in monitoring the government's activities. The risk of political control of RCs, coupled with the increasing specification of their functions, may eventually turn the RC system into a rigid bureaucratic structure blindly implementing central government policy rather than functioning as a vehicle for the empowerment of people in local development and environmental management.
126 Nevertheless, final judgment on the role of RCs in natural resources and wetlands management cannot be made until the proposed Local Government Statute is in place.
STRENGTHENING T H E LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
The Ugandan experience with wetlands management suggests that local government and property law are indispensable for translating environmental policy objectives into effective management practice. The environmental problems facing Uganda cannot be attributed solely to high population growth, technological change and economic demand, but are also caused by the historic neglect of the public policy process of which law is an integral component. The way people make decisions about the environment has a critical influence on eventual outcomes. The type of rules and procedures embodied in a legal system can have an important bearing on how environmental policy develops and is applied. The most promising approach for sustainable wetlands management is through a common property regime, whereby the access and use of the resource is shared by a community, with management coordinated by local government bodies. The sustainable development of wetlands and other natural resources will only be reached if all affected and concerned parties are involved in the policy process and feel that they benefit from management decisions. Where certain interests feel excluded from decision-making, controversial autonomous actions may take place. 127 The overall objective for wetlands management is to develop a policy process which can take account of the ecological complexity of these resources and the need for a catchment-wide analytical approach to management which captures the full range of activities influencing wetlands, while at the same time ensuring that communities which use and depend on wetlands are intimately involved in the formulation and implementation of management strategies. The legal framework for natural resources management depends fundamentally on the delineation of property rights over the relevant resource, whether they be wetlands, forests or savanna. There are three broad property regimes available, state, common and private.
128 These property regimes can be reinforced by institutional structures for the planning and regulation of resource use, whether local government and community organizations in the case of common property regimes or central government agencies for state property regimes. The type of property regime availed should depend ultimately on the characteristics of the resource in question and its uses.
In general, natural resources of national significance, such as wetlands listed under the Ramsar Convention, should be vested in the state. These areas can be designated as national parks or equivalent protected area categories. The main advantage of a state property regime is that it gives the central government an enormous capacity as a land-holder to control access and use by third parties in the land it owns. State control can be extended to natural resources throughout a country, whereby the responsible government agency would then grant the public access and user rights on the basis of licence or lease, with appropriate environmental conditions attached. Such a regime would depend, inter alia, on detailed surveying of resources, reinforced by a strong field inspectorate to ensure that environmental conditions are complied with. But in view of the limited institutional capacity of the central government in developing countries to undertake comprehensive environmental management programmes in the field, it is unlikely that this approach could be implemented effectively. It is best to concentrate and target limited government resources on those specific areas and environments of national importance rather than trying to assume responsibility for entire regions which would inevitably result in spreading resources too thinly to achieve any effective management. In a critique of state property regimes in the developing world, Bromley concludes:
"Nationalization of natural resources-and the attempt to control and manage natural resources from afar-is simply a form of domestic colonialism and leaves resource users and managers open to the whims of distant bureaucrats who believe that the solution to deforestation is to pass a law prohibiting the cutting of firewood. To set the people against natural resources only invites cynicism and lawlessness, and does little to protect natural resources. The record on this is now unexceptionable. Successful management of natural resources in the developing countries awaits the reestablishment of effective resource management regimes at the local level."
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(NGOs) or co-operatives, which would manage the area for the benefit of their members. NGOs and co-operatives which are incorporated and have a legal personality are capable of owning and dealing in land. This approach could provide for the participation of traditional authorities, such as tribal elders, on the NGO governing boards. One institutional solution which meets farmers' need for individual assets, whilst ensuring that the resource and surrounding catchment areas are managed in a co-ordinated way, is to allow the concerned individuals to own shares in the organization that manages the area. For example, each member of the NGO could have a legal "share" in a wetland, which would constitute an asset which could be traded or used to secure loans for approved development purposes. The share certificate could also entitle the holder to revenue from utilization of the wetland for such purposes as tourism or fishing. The only area to be physically subdivided would be the surrounding small settlement area, whilst subdividing the wetland theoretically, not physically, into a number of shares. The result is that the resource remains as a physical unit. The NGO would be required to manage the resource in the best interests of its members, subject to overall national minimum standards for the conservation and management of wetlands. Natural resource planning can be more easily accomplished under a community share scheme since there would no longer be disputes about whose individual piece of land is used or who benefits. Through contractual agreements, the government can channel financial and technical assistance to competent NGOs, in return for a commitment to manage the resource according to agreed principles. Alternatively, land use rules can be written into the land title assigned to each NGO. Another variation is for the state to retain ownership rights, but for individual wetland or other resources to be leased to approved NGOs which would carry out the assigned management functions. A weakness of these approaches, however, is that government monitoring and enforcement measures may be difficult to apply. But they are less costly than a state ownership and management regime, and more flexible as the land use restrictions written into management agreements may be limited to what is strictly necessary to ensure conservation goals are met.
It is not just the location but the composition of management bodies that determines their effectiveness and impartiality. It is essential that they are pluralized to give representation to as many concerned and affected interests as is administratively possible. Local managers need to be made more accountable to the people. Chiefs and other administrative officers should be transformed into agents of the locally elected authorities rather than appointees of the Ministry of Local Government. Legislation could guarantee a minimum number of representatives on local government bodies from local communities. In the case of NGOs, the assignment of management responsibilities would be conditional upon them demonstrating that their membership is representative of the community or locality that they are drawn from.
A third approach to natural resources management is to put small or relatively insignificant resource areas under private property, subject to some overriding statutory controls on usage (such as prohibitions on conversion and pollution). This could be reinforced by use of financial mechanisms and appropriate law enforcement strategies. Historical experience suggests that creating private property rights in land tends to result in the concentration of ownership in the better-off segments of
